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THE LAW OF LENITY: ENACTING A CODIFIED
FEDERAL RULE OF LENITY
MAISIE A. WILSON†
ABSTRACT
The rule of lenity is an ancient canon of statutory construction that
requires courts to find in favor of criminal defendants charged under
ambiguous statutes. Traditionally, lenity endorses important
constitutional concerns regarding due notice, consistent enforcement of
law, and legislative supremacy. In modern courts, if lenity were
regularly—and properly—applied, it could combat important social
problems that plague our criminal justice system. Ambiguous laws
allow government actors to arbitrarily target disfavored groups. And
more generally, ambiguity within criminal law contributes to
overcriminalization, wanton punishment, and capricious enforcement.
As the volume of federal criminal law continues to expand, this
overcriminalization leads to extreme mass incarceration in the United
States. Lenity, if applied more potently in the federal courts, could help
combat these serious social issues by supplying a safety valve against
the multitude of ambiguous statutes written by Congress.
The problem with lenity today, however, is that courts are rarely
clear where lenity should fit within criminal statutory interpretation.
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, alter how they apply
lenity case by case. This Note argues that lenity should be codified
federally as a clear statement rule, as several states have already done.
Specifically, to achieve a consistent and strong application of lenity in
the federal courts, Congress should direct the federal courts to apply
lenity immediately after an initial textual analysis fails to clarify an
ambiguous statute. Codified lenity would guide courts in lenity’s
application and underscore its fundamental importance to the criminal
justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
Is a fish a tangible object? The Supreme Court has held that it is
not, due in part to the rule of lenity.1 When fisherman John Yates set
out on a routine commercial fishing expedition on the Gulf of Mexico,
he could not have predicted that it would end with his facing a twentyyear sentence for violating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 a federal statute
designed to protect financial investors.3 After searching Yates’s vessel,
the Miss Katie, in a routine regulatory compliance check, a fish and
wildlife officer found seventy-two red grouper that fell about an inch
short of federal conservation size regulations.4 The officer boxed the
prohibited fish in separate crates and directed Yates to leave them
alone until returning to port.5 When the officer returned to Yates’s
boat in port, he found that the fish in the segregated box were
suspiciously no longer in violation of the size regulations.6 When
questioned, a crew member admitted that the undersized fish had been
thrown overboard and replaced with larger fish.7
Federal prosecutors charged Yates with “destroying, concealing,
and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation,” in
violation of § 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.8 Section 1519 provides,
in part, that anyone who knowingly destroys or conceals “any record,
document, or tangible object” with the intent of impeding a federal
investigation shall be fined, imprisoned a maximum of twenty years, or
both.9

1. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 547–48 (2015) (plurality opinion).
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2018).
3. Yates, 574 U.S. at 531.
4. Id. at 533. According to federal conservation regulations at the time, fishermen had to
throw back any red grouper shorter than twenty inches that they caught. Id. Almost all of Yates’s
fish were nineteen to twenty inches, and none shorter than 18.75 inches. Id. By the time of Yates’s
indictment, the size minimum had been lowered to eighteen inches. Id. at 534. These regulations
“allow fish to reach a size that enables spawning before being harvested.” How To Fish, FLA.
FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N, https://myfwc.com/fishing/saltwater/recreational/
how-to-fish [https://perma.cc/8MJT-SHHU].
5. Yates, 574 U.S. at 533.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 533–34.
8. Id. at 534. The charges were brought almost three years after the incident, but the
Supreme Court noted that the reasons for this substantial delay were not in the record. Id.
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2018) (emphasis added).
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At trial, Yates argued that fish were not included in the statute’s
term “tangible object.”10 He maintained that § 1519 set forth “a
documents offense” and its reference to “tangible object[s]” includes
“computer hard drives, logbooks, [and] things of that nature”—but not
fish.11 This definition, Yates reasoned, would align with the SarbanesOxley Act’s anticorporate fraud origins.12 The government argued that
“tangible object” meant “simply something other than a document or
record.”13 Following a four-day trial, a jury found Yates guilty of the
federal felony charges.14
A plurality of the Supreme Court reversed Yates’s conviction.15 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court first exhausted its “traditional tools
of statutory construction” and, as there was doubt left as to the
meaning of “tangible object,” the plurality invoked the rule of lenity to
save Yates from the permanent stigma of a federal felony conviction
for throwing the undersized fish overboard.16 In the plurality opinion,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained her application of lenity: “[I]t
is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”17
The dissent criticized the plurality for turning to lenity before “all
legitimate tools of interpretation [had] been exhausted” and when “‘a
reasonable doubt persists’ regarding whether Congress has made the
defendant’s conduct a federal crime.”18 Instead, according to the
dissent, the statute was clear, and lenity offered “no proper refuge from
that straightforward (even though capacious) construction.”19 The
dissent argued that the straightforward, ordinary meaning of the term

10. Yates, 574 U.S. at 534.
11. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 91–92, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451)).
12. See id. at 535 (detailing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was “prompted by the exposure of
Enron’s massive accounting fraud”).
13. Id. at 534 (quoting Joint Appendix at 93, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451)).
14. Yates v. United States, 733 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (11th Cir. 2013), rev’d, Yates, 574 U.S. at
549.
15. Yates, 574 U.S. at 549.
16. Id. at 547–49. In spite of his ultimate dissent in this case, at oral argument Justice Antonin
Scalia (rightly) remarked, “What kind of a mad prosecutor would try to send this guy up for 20
years . . . ?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451).
17. Yates, 574 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)).
18. Id. at 566 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 264
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
19. Id.
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“tangible object” would include fish.20 Still, the plurality held that lenity
was necessary because Yates would otherwise have “scant reason to
anticipate a felony prosecution” given the unrelated nature of the
statute.21 Essentially, fairness to the defendant necessitated the use of
lenity.22
The rule of lenity, also called the doctrine of strict construction,23
is a common canon of statutory construction that requires courts to
“construe statutory ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.”24 For
lenity to apply, courts have ordinarily required that the statute have
“grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.”25 Then, once lenity applies, it tips
the scales in the defendant’s favor in the interest of due process,26
consistent enforcement of the law, and legislative supremacy.27
However, in spite of lenity’s important constitutional foundations,
modern courts apply the rule of lenity in an inconsistent manner that
“water[s] down” the rule’s original mandate and purpose.28
Instead, if courts regularly applied lenity, this rule could partially
address important social problems in the criminal justice system.
20. Id. at 553–54. As the concurrence drolly stated, this definition of “tangible object” would
also include “an antelope, a colonial farmhouse, a hydrofoil, or an oil derrick.” Id. at 550 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment).
21. Id. at 547 (plurality opinion).
22. Lenity has also played a role in other interesting, if less sympathetic, prosecutions. For
example, the Court invoked lenity in the high-profile case of former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010). The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which
forbids fraudulent deprivations of “the intangible right of honest services,” should be confined to
only instances of bribery or kickbacks because of the serious (though intended) ambiguity of the
statute as applied to other types of conduct. Id. Because Skilling’s alleged conduct involved
defrauding shareholders and not bribery or kickbacks, the Court applied lenity, stating that “[i]f
Congress desires to go further . . . it must speak more clearly than it has.” Id. at 411 (quoting
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)).
23. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885
(2004).
24. Id.
25. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (quoting Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994)).
26. Id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 375 (2d ed. 2006).
Ambiguous statutes are those with multiple possible meanings. Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and
Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 129
(Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma eds., 2012).
27. See Price, supra note 23, at 886 (stating that the rationales for the rule of lenity include
providing notice, ensuring legislative supremacy, and “block[ing] expansive readings . . . by
requiring courts to choose narrow interpretations automatically”).
28. Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 698 (2017).
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Ambiguity
within
the
criminal
context
contributes
to
overcriminalization,
wanton
punishment,
and
capricious
enforcement.29 The volume of “federal criminal law has exploded in
size and scope” in recent decades, with estimates showing that there
are currently almost five thousand federal criminal laws and three
hundred thousand regulations with “potential criminal penalties.”30
This has led to extreme mass incarceration in the United States, a
country with 5 percent of the world’s population but 25 percent of the
world’s prisoners.31 Although the focus of this Note is the federal
system which accounts for only 8.5 percent of incarceration in the
United States,32 a federal statute can serve as a prominent example for
states to follow. The federal government could also “use its financial
and ideological power” to help pave the way for the states to follow
suit.33 Unclear laws in any jurisdiction allow government actors in the
criminal justice system to discriminatorily target groups such as racial

29. Id. at 699.
30. Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND. [hereinafter Overcriminalization, HERITAGE],
https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/heritage-explains/overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/
HJS8-XDKZ].
31. Charles G. Koch & Mark V. Holden, Overcriminalization of America, POLITICO (Jan. 7,
2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/overcriminalization-of-america-113991
[https://perma.cc/DT2V-BDLN].
32. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpus1718.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6VM-2Y5V].
33. Wendy Sawyer & Pete Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/
NBH8-FJBY]. Lenity is especially appropriate in the federal regime because of the many reasons
that all lead to longer sentences when an individual is convicted of a federal crime. See Prison
Time Surges for Federal Inmates, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Nov. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Prison
Time, PEW], https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/prisontime-surges-for-federal-inmates [https://perma.cc/8RYW-7ZYD] (finding that the average length
of time served by federal inmates rose from 17.9 months in 1988 to 37.5 months in 2012). First,
the federal Sentencing Guidelines are “premised on the idea that a term of imprisonment is the
default option in the vast majority of cases.” Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time To
Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L. REV. 113, 118 (2018). Second, a vast number of
federal crimes are subject to mandatory minimums that “result in long sentences.” U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBG5-S95C]. Third,
there is no parole in the federal system. Prison Time, PEW, supra.
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minorities,34 LGBTQ+ individuals,35 and the indigent.36 Lenity, if
applied more robustly in the federal courts, could help combat these
serious social issues by supplying a safety valve against the multitude
of ambiguous statutes written by Congress.
The problem with lenity, however, is that federal courts are rarely
clear about where it fits within a criminal statutory interpretation
framework.37 Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, fluctuate
case by case as to whether lenity should be a canon of last resort,
whether it should come second only to a textual analysis, or whether it
should even be applied when “textualism would support a broader
view.”38
Inevitably, problems arise from this vacillation and uncertain
application. But lenity could instead be codified federally as a clear
statement rule, as several states have already done.39 If lenity were
interpreted in a constant, reliable way, canons of statutory
interpretation could “at least form a more or less reliable ‘interpretive
regime.’”40 This regime could direct courts, and others involved in law
enforcement, as to how criminal statutes should be interpreted.41 This
Note maintains that it would further incentivize Congress to draft laws
that are unambiguous, which would in turn allow for a more certain
and consistent interpretation of criminal statutes and thereby provide
more notice for criminal defendants and less discriminatory application
of these laws. As one scholar stated, “Lenity lies at the heart of
interpretive questions in the criminal justice arena, the state of which
adds urgency and cause for greater consideration of the framework and

34. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 n.20 (1999).
35. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817,
861–63 (1997).
36. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
37. United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Price, supra note 23, at 890–
91.
38. Price, supra note 23, at 893–94; see, e.g., Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8
(2016) (stating that lenity is a canon of last resort); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (using lenity after a textual analysis failed); McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (using lenity when textualism might otherwise be used).
39. See infra Part III.A.
40. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences
Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2018).
41. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994).
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application of the rule.”42 This Note argues that, to achieve a consistent
and robust application of lenity in the federal courts, Congress should
codify the rule of lenity, dictating that lenity apply after an initial
textual analysis fails to clarify an ambiguous statute. This would guide
courts in lenity’s application and express its fundamental importance
in the criminal justice system. As other academic work contends with
the value of a robust and clear rule of lenity,43 this Note adds to the
scholarship by proposing a concrete legislative solution to the
haphazard application of the modern rule in the federal courts.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the problems
lenity can alleviate, the background of statutory interpretation, and
lenity’s place among the canons. Part II looks at the inconsistent
application of lenity in the federal courts and discusses why
codification would reduce this unpredictability. Finally, Part III
proposes a codified rule to combat lenity’s unpredictable and weak
application in the federal courts and draws some inspiration on lenity’s
role from states that have previously codified a similar clear statement
rule.
I. THE CONTEXT AND DOCTRINE OF LENITY
Lenity is a complex doctrine, and it is important to study it in
context to understand its innate value and disappointing history of
inconsistent application. This Part examines some of the problems in
the criminal justice system that lenity can improve. It then looks at the
origins and methods of substantive canons of statutory interpretation.
Finally, it examines the basic doctrine of lenity in the criminal context
and its primary justifications.
A. The Problem
Overcriminalization, or “the overuse and abuse of criminal law,”44
is a huge and growing issue in the United States that has gained

42. Intisar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 181–82 (2018).
43. See generally, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 28 (arguing for a clear statement rule to avoid
vagueness in federal criminal law); Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51
EMORY L.J. 753 (2002) (arguing for a clear statement rule in ambiguous statutes with low mens
rea thresholds); Price, supra note 23 (arguing generally for a stronger rule of lenity in criminal
law).
44. Overcriminalization, HERITAGE, supra note 30.
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increasing scrutiny from those on either end of the political spectrum.45
The number of federal criminal laws has grown astronomically even in
the past decades.46 In the 1980s, the U.S. Code already contained a
considerable three thousand criminal offenses, which has crept up to
approximately 4,500 criminal offenses today.47 Some commentators
blame this huge increase on congressmembers’ attempts “to score
political points with voters” who believe that more laws and increased
penalties “somehow solve[] a crime problem.”48 But whatever the
cause of overcriminalization, its effect is devastating. One scholar has
even gone so far as to say that overcriminalization “threaten[s] the very
foundation of our free society.”49 And as the number of laws has
exploded, “so has the level of ambiguity within those laws.”50
The result of such an enormous criminal code comprised of
ambiguous statutes that “cover everything and decide nothing” is to
essentially place lawmaking power in the hands of prosecutors, police,
and judges.51 Each new law provides “a new legal instrument to apply
against members of the so-called ‘criminal class.’”52 Further, such a
broad criminal code means that it is impossible to enforce all the laws
on the books; prosecutors and police instead have to use their own
discretion and priorities to choose which laws to enforce.53

45. See generally ACLU Criminal Law Reform Project, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclucriminal-law-reform-project [https://perma.cc/KTZ7-K8QK] (arguing against overcriminalization from
a liberal perspective); Overcriminalization, HERITAGE, supra note 30 (arguing against
overcriminalization from a conservative perspective).
46. Overcriminalization, HERITAGE, supra note 30.
47. Id.; GianCarlo Canaparo & Zack Smith, Count the Crimes on the Federal Law Books. Then
Cut Them., HERITAGE FOUND. (June 24, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/
commentary/count-the-crimes-the-federal-law-books-then-cut-them [https://perma.cc/ZD4F-3BCQ].
48. Overcriminalization, HERITAGE, supra note 30.
49. Tim Lynch, Overcriminalization, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/cato-handbookpolicymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/
382J-48TL]; see also Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Overcriminalization Task Force Should Focus on
Reducing
Prison Populations, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July
26,
2013),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/overcriminalization-task-force-shouldfocus-reducing-prison-populations [https://perma.cc/GN2U-WLAF] (calling overcriminalization
and overincarceration an “epidemic” in the United States).
50. Hopwood, supra note 28, at 695–96.
51. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509
(2001); see also Hopwood, supra note 28, at 703.
52. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 703, 711 (2005).
53. Stuntz, supra note 51, at 519.
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An enormous criminal code also contributes to prisons bursting at
the seams and overburdened courts.54 But more importantly, it leads to
millions of individuals getting caught up in the criminal justice system,55
with huge racial disparities.56 As of 2018, there were over 6.4 million
people in the correctional system, either incarcerated or under
community supervision.57 The collateral effects of incarceration touch
spouses, partners, children, and families.58 Although codified lenity
would not come close to solving every problem, it could serve as an
important backstop to the excessive number of federal criminal laws
and their inconsistent application.
B. The Function of Canons of Construction in Statutory
Interpretation
Canons of construction are generally “a set of background norms
and conventions that are used by courts when interpreting statutes.”59
Though the Supreme Court has called canons simply “rules of thumb”60
to help interpret statutes, their use is complicated.61 Though many state
legislatures have provided a framework for the use of canons in
statutory interpretation, Congress has only codified one
comprehensive interpretive statute that functions similarly to a canon,
the Dictionary Act, which defines several words applicable across the

54. Overcriminalization, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/
Landing/Overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/7PLS-ZCWW].
55. Id.
56. See SENT’G PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 5 (2020), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/trends-in-u-s-corrections [https://perma.cc/9K8E-L2D5]
(“Black men are six times as likely to be incarcerated as white men and Hispanic men are 2.7
times as likely.”).
57. MARUSCHAK & MINTON, supra note 32, at 1. Of these 6.4 million people, about 2.1
million are incarcerated. Id. at 2. This equates to about one out of every one hundred Americans.
Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (Oct. 2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/
2014/10/ incarceration [https://perma.cc/H28Z-UQMC].
58. Tony N. Brown & Evelyn Patterson, Wounds from Incarceration that Never Heal, NEW
REPUBLIC (June 28, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/134712/wounds-incarceration-neverheal [https://perma.cc/5Y4L-QYED].
59. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
60. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
61. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 59, at 7 (calling the reality of using canons of
construction “more complicated”).
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U.S. Code.62 Essentially, federal judges have extremely broad
discretion over which canons to use, when to use them, how persuasive
they are, and where they fit in with other methods of statutory
interpretation, such as legislative purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.63
Canons of construction can generally be divided into two main
categories: textual canons and substantive canons.64 Textual canons are
considered “guidelines for evaluating linguistic or syntactic meaning”65
and tend to be noncontroversial due to their long-standing use and
generally accepted understandings.66 Substantive canons, on the other
hand, such as constitutional avoidance, tend to be much more
controversial due to their roots in “broader policy or value
judgments”67 that “explicitly embody some substantive preference
about the law.”68 With substantive canons, judges are theoretically
intended to “harmonize statutory meaning with policies” from “the
common law, other statutes, or the Constitution.”69 These canons—

62. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 898 & n.307 (2017) [hereinafter Krishnakumar,
Reconsidering Substantive Canons].
63. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 59, at 7; see also Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F.
Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163, 169 (2018) (“[A]s a general rule, canons are judicial
assumptions about meaning—default rules. Default rules are second-best guesses or policies that apply
when all first-best evidence fails.”). Professor Abbe Gluck and former Judge Richard Posner have
conducted a survey of federal appellate judges on their approach to statutory interpretation. See generally
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two
Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1301 (2018) (“This Article reports
the results of a survey of forty-two federal appellate judges regarding their approaches to statutory
interpretation, including their consideration of statutory text, dictionaries, the canons of construction,
legislative history, and purpose.”). According to thirteen of these judges, lenity was an “actual rule,”
distinct from other discretionary canons, and they considered it mandatory “substantive law.” Id. at
1332. However, other scholars have noted that appellate judges use the lenity framework much
less often than the Supreme Court. Rabb, supra note 42, at 205–06. Professor Intisar Rabb noted
that federal appellate courts applied the framework in only 22 percent of eligible cases. Id.
64. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 341–42 (identifying textual canons, substantive
canons, and an additional category of “extrinsic” canons referencing legislative history and agency
interpretation, which, for purposes of this Note, are considered alongside substantive canons).
65. Id.
66. Id. Textual canons can be defined as “[t]extual reasoning and rules [that] ask what the
statutory text typically means to an ordinary speaker of the language, as well as how well different
possible meanings fit with the statute (or even the code) as a whole.” Id. at 257.
67. Id. at 342.
68. STEVEN F. HUEFNER, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 387 (2017).
69. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 342.
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which include the rule of lenity70—are also quite numerous and
“significantly affect” general statutory interpretation taking place in
courts.71
Some criticize substantive canons because judges can apply them
in a biased fashion reflecting the judge’s individual policy positions72 or
in other nonneutral manners.73 These canons are inherently
indeterminate due to their discretionary use74 and because almost
every canon has a competing canon leading to the opposite result.75
This means interpreters of statutes can pick and choose from canons to
reach whatever outcome they want.76 Others criticize substantive
canons because they allow “strong judges” to “override the intent of
the legislature in order to make law according to their own views” and
frustrate the legislature’s policy preferences.77 However, sometimes
these canons are praised for furthering “rule-of-law norms” that alert
Congress to how laws should be initially written to aid later judicial
interpretation.78
Federal judges’ wide latitude to pick between these canons creates
uncertainty, and the Supreme Court’s inconsistent interpretations have
created a complex web that lower courts must somehow unravel in
order to follow.79 However, in spite of their obvious limitations, canons

70. HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 387–89.
71. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 342.
72. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 59, at 13–14.
73. HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 398–99.
74. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 59, at 7–9.
75. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950)
(identifying almost thirty sets of competing canons of construction). An example of competing
canons is a pair of canons summarized as: (1) “[a] statute cannot go beyond its text”; and (2) “[t]o
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.” Id. at 401. Ostensibly, an
interpreter could choose one or the other to affect the outcome that they wanted. See generally
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016) (examining the Supreme
Court’s use of canons in both the majority and dissenting opinions in the same case to support
opposing outcomes).
76. HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 399–400.
77. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 890
(1930); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 570 (1992).
78. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 59, at 8–9.
79. Scholars have even noted that canons are so uncertain that “no established consensus
exists regarding the criteria for achieving canon status.” Krishnakumar & Nourse, supra note 63,
at 168.
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of construction remain “widely used and defended.”80 But whatever
way canons are used by the courts, clear statement, codified rules
regarding statutory interpretation can alleviate some of the uncertainty
in the courts and political discretion currently experienced by judges.81
C. The Rule of Lenity and Its Justifications
As stated above, the rule of lenity is a common law substantive
canon that requires courts to construe an ambiguous statute in favor of
a criminal defendant.82 However, the Supreme Court has not
consistently settled on an overall framework for applying lenity.83
Generally, to apply the rule of lenity, a judge must first at least find
that the plain text of the statute at issue is ambiguous.84 This requires
that the judge “generate possible readings of the text” before choosing
the narrowest one by “invoking lenity.”85 The judge first uses textual
canons to make this initial finding of ambiguity.86 Of course, finding
ambiguity in a statute requires its own “interpretive, legal judgment.”87
Because of this first finding of textual ambiguity, lenity has been called
a “meta-rule” because “[i]t is a rule about the application of other rules
of statutory construction.”88

80. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 25 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45153.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5574-QPHC].
81. Conversely, criminal justice reformers sometimes argue against uniformity of
interpretation and instead call for judges to tailor their approach case by case. In certain close
cases, giving judges discretion can protect defendants (or victims). Especially in the sentencing
context, reformers often call for judges to have wide discretion to make decisions, thinking that
this leads to more fair sentencing overall. Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for
Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/onejudge-makes-the-case-for-judgment/463380 [https://perma.cc/7PGE-SXE8]; Ruth Sangree &
Rachel Barkow, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/breaking-cycle-mass-incarceration [https://
perma.cc/EF6C-KHAC]. But in the lenity context where the rule is designed to favor defendants,
limiting a judge’s discretion would only ever serve the defendant’s interests.
82. Price, supra note 23, at 885, 891–92. For a thorough analysis of a finding of ambiguity, see
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 384–86.
83. See infra Part II.A.
84. See Price, supra note 23, at 890 (“The rule of lenity . . . requires the judge to make a
finding of ambiguity—and textual ambiguity is itself an interpretive, legal judgment.” (emphasis
omitted)).
85. Id.
86. Kahan, supra note 82, at 384–86.
87. Price, supra note 23, at 890 (emphasis omitted).
88. Id. at 889.
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Justice Antonin Scalia lamented that the rule of lenity often
affords “little more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial
question—almost invariably present—of how much ambiguousness
constitutes an ambiguity.”89 The Supreme Court has clarified
somewhat that “[t]he simple existence of some statutory
ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of [the rule of
lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”90 But there is
significant controversy about which interpretive tools should properly
be used to discern the text’s meaning before turning to lenity.91
In spite of the controversy surrounding its application, lenity
serves important constitutional ideals. Lenity’s justifications include
fair notice—that a defendant should receive fair notice of a statute’s
prohibited behavior by the court’s adopting a strict, narrow
interpretation of the conduct proscribed by statute.92 This notion is
rooted in the constitutional value of due process.93 The other primary
justifications for lenity are legislative supremacy and uniformity—that
lenity “prevents judicial usurpation of the legislative power to
determine what conduct is criminal.”94 Both the constitutional
principle of due process and the constitutional principle of equal
protection are implicated by this justification.95 Chief Justice John

89. United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.).
90. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (emphasis added).
91. See Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of
Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 198 (1994) (“Because the courts must find that a statute
is ambiguous before applying the rule [of lenity], the method of and background materials
referred to in statutory construction affect the scope of the use of lenity.”); see also infra Part II.A.
Finding ambiguity is not a novel concept to courts; the first step of the common Chevron
deference framework is finding ambiguity in a statute. VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44954, CHEVRON DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 14 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44954.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWA3-PB2F].
92. Marie Gryphon, The Better Part of Lenity, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 717, 718 (2011).
93. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 375–76. The Constitution forbids the federal
government and the states to deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Due process “looms large in criminal procedure, and is
also important as a limitation on the manner and extent to which conduct may be defined as
criminal in the substantive criminal law.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 182 (6th ed. 2017).
94. Gryphon, supra note 92, at 718. This justification is similar to the legislative supremacy
doctrine where “[c]riminal law must be a product of a clear judgment on Congress’s part,” not a
product of judicial decree. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 332
(2000).
95. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 375–76; see U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Equal
protection “governs all governmental actions which classify individuals for different benefits or
burdens under the law” and “requir[es] that individuals be treated in a manner similar to other
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Marshall encapsulated the fair notice and legislative supremacy
rationales for lenity when writing for the Court in 1820: “The rule that
penal laws are to be construed strictly . . . is founded on the tenderness
of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that
the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department.”96
Despite the constitutional justifications for the rule of lenity, there
has always been substantial controversy surrounding its application
and continued usage. Even in 1776, Jeremy Bentham deemed lenity
“the subject of more constant controversy, than perhaps of any in the
whole circle of the Law.”97 Today, many scholars argue that lenity is
applied haphazardly by federal courts, subverting its justifications of
fair notice and predictability in criminal law.98 Additionally, there is
significant controversy regarding lenity’s overall place within the
canonical hierarchy.99
Lenity’s legislative supremacy justification is also controversial by
virtue of the legislature’s possible preference that courts read their
ambiguously drafted statutes as broadly as possible.100 Ambiguous
language in criminal statutes may be a legislative attempt to delegate a
statute’s case-by-case discretionary enforcement to courts and law
enforcement, as is common in administrative and civil law.101 However,
the rule of lenity compels the legislature to “detail the breadth of
prohibitions in advance of their enforcement” to explicitly give notice
of prohibited criminal conduct.102 With the ever-expanding catalog of

similarly situated persons.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
741 (8th ed. 2010). The Supreme Court has recognized a “‘fundamental right’ to fair treatment in
the criminal justice system for purposes of equal protection.” Id. at 1197.
96. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
97. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 141 (Charles Warren Everett ed.,
Clarendon Press 1928) (1776).
98. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 82, at 346 (“Judicial enforcement of lenity is notoriously
sporadic and unpredictable.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1083 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values] (stating that rule of
lenity cases are “capricious” and involve “random invocation” of the rule); Stephen F. Smith,
Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 567 (2012) (“[C]ourts are
notoriously inconsistent in their adherence to the venerable rule of lenity.”).
99. See infra Part II.A.
100. Price, supra note 23, at 886.
101. Kahan, supra note 82, at 367–70; Price, supra note 23, at 886.
102. Price, supra note 23, at 887.
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criminal law, lenity is an important check on the legislature’s power
and on courts’ discretion.103
II. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LENITY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
Because of lenity’s historically chaotic application, a clear
statement rule, codified by Congress, would supply more certainty and
uniformity desperately needed in federal criminal law. First, this Part
examines the inconsistent application of lenity and the different
formulations of the rule. Second, it explores the validity of codifying
canons. Finally, it assesses why codifying the lenity-second approach
specifically would create a more robust version of lenity in the federal
courts.
A. Three Different Formulations of the Rule of Lenity Framework
Part of lenity’s controversy stems from its haphazard application
and fluctuating relationship to other canons. There are three primary
views of how lenity should fit into the rest of the statutory
interpretation framework.104 Different coalitions of Supreme Court
Justices have used these different interpretations at various times,
though only the lenity-last and lenity-second frameworks are generally
applied by modern federal courts.105 In recent decades, the Court has
most often used the lenity-last approach,106 but has occasionally used
the lenity-second approach advocated by Justice Scalia.107
1. The Lenity-Last Approach. In recent history the Court has held
most often, with important exceptions, that lenity is a canon of last

103. Hopwood, supra note 28, at 695–96, 738–39.
104. See Gryphon, supra note 92, at 720–21 (differentiating the lenity-last view and Justice
Scalia’s view of lenity); Kahan, supra note 82, at 390–96 (differentiating the lenity-last and the
lenity-first approaches); Price, supra note 23, at 889–96 (differentiating the lenity-last approach,
Justice Scalia’s lenity-second approach, and the lenity-first approach); Rabb, supra note 42, at
188–93 (differentiating the lenity-first formulation, the lenity-last formulation, and Justice Scalia’s
textualist rule of lenity).
105. Rabb, supra note 42, at 189 (stating that the lenity-first framework “was common on the
Supreme Court when lenity was first incorporated into American law, and continued to be in use
until relatively recently”).
106. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2351–52 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
107. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 299 (2012).
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resort.108 The Court endorsed this view in Ocasio v. United States,109
stating that lenity can only be invoked when there is a “grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty” in a criminal statute, so extreme that the
Court “can make no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.”110 Under this lenity-last theory, a court would rely upon
lenity only if there was an interpretive “tie” after all other interpretive
methods failed111—methods which would include exhausting textual
canons, other substantive canons, legislative history, and purposive
arguments.112
For example, Muscarello v. United States113 involved a provision of
the U.S. Code that imposes a five-year mandatory minimum sentence
on anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to”
a “drug trafficking crime.”114 The defendant, Frank Muscarello,
illegally sold marijuana; when he was stopped on his way to sell the
drug, police discovered a gun in his locked glove compartment.115
Muscarello argued that “carr[ying]” a gun in a locked glove
compartment did not fall under the statute’s prohibition on carrying a
firearm during drug trafficking.116 After first examining the statute’s
text, Congress’s legislative intent, the statute’s purpose, and the overall
statutory scheme, the majority concluded that the statute covered
Muscarello’s conduct, and dismissed Muscarello’s claims of lenity.117
The lenity-last interpretation has one of two potential problems:
either lenity would never apply at all because the Court can usually
find some meaning in a statute beyond a “guess” as to Congress’s
intent, or lenity would be a completely superfluous doctrine because if

108. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent in Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2351–52 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting), lists the following cases as precedent for the proposition that lenity is a canon of last
resort: Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S.
415, 429 (2009); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998); United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482, 499 (1997); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,
17 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103,
108 (1990); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
109. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423 (2016).
110. Id. at 1434 n.8 (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138–39).
111. Price, supra note 23, at 891.
112. Id. (citing Kahan, supra note 82, at 386).
113. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2018); Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126.
115. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 127–39.
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the Court had to guess what Congress intended, there would be no
meaningful law to apply.118 As one scholar argues, the lenity-last
approach means that “[c]ompeting views of the statute will disappear,
reconciled by other conventions, before the rule even comes into
operation.”119 If courts used all other methods of interpretation first,
then there would be no tie left for lenity to break.
A superfluous rule of lenity under the lenity-last theory is not
enough. As another scholar notes, “[r]anking lenity ‘last’ among
interpretive conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance” because
canons of statutory interpretation are intended to resolve questions of
ambiguity.120 When a court can use any possible interpretation method
at its disposal, it may never find room for ambiguity. In contrast, a
hardier doctrine of lenity supplies an important check on government
actors and provides important constitutional protection for criminal
defendants.
2. The Lenity-First Approach. A second view of lenity, the lenityfirst theory, is extremely favorable to defendants. Under this theory of
interpretation, “the [application] of lenity might also mean confining
the reach of criminal statutes even in cases where textualism would
support a broader view.”121 Under this method, a judge would accept
the narrowest plausible interpretation of the statute in favor of the
defendant even before textual or other canons had been exhausted.122
Though popular with early courts, this formulation of lenity has fallen
into disuse in modern courts.123

118. Justice Scalia, responding to a statement in a Court opinion that lenity should only apply
when “the equipoise of competing reasons cannot otherwise be resolved,” wrote: “[T]he rule [of
lenity] either would never apply (when is the last time you read a decision saying that an
interpretive ‘equipoise’ could not be resolved?) or would be superfluous (if alternative meanings
were in utter equipoise, the statute would be inoperative as meaningless).” SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 107, at 298 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 n.13 (2000)).
119. Price, supra note 23, at 890.
120. Kahan, supra note 82, at 386.
121. Price, supra note 23, at 893–94.
122. Id.
123. Rabb, supra note 42, at 188 (“A close examination of past judicial practice reveals early
and deliberate emphasis on lenity first, which is now experiencing a late-onset
displacement . . . .”).
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This method has not been explicitly articulated in judicial
opinions,124 but Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes appears to use this
lenity-first in his opinion in McBoyle v. United States.125 In McBoyle,
the Court held that the defendant’s crime of transporting a stolen
airplane did not fall within a federal statute prohibiting theft of “motor
vehicles.”126 Although the statute specifically enumerated other
prohibited vehicles, it would have been plausible to read the text as
also prohibiting the defendant’s conduct.127 Justice Holmes focused on
the necessity of fair warning to the defendant from the narrowest plain
meaning of the text alone, and explained that the Justices’ considering
policy or speculating about the legislature’s intent would not provide
the proper warning.128
Under lenity-first, if any of the plain text, legislative history, or
policy considerations suggested that the statute should be construed
narrowly against the defendant, the more lenient plausible
interpretation would win.129 This extremely broad use of lenity is likely
inoperable. Using this approach, “judges might manipulate the
threshold judgment of plausibility” and by “judicial fiat” undermine
the intent of the legislature.130 If lenity could be applied before even a
textual analysis of a statute, the courts could usurp the legislature’s
power to make the laws. With this approach, lenity would trump even
the written text.
3. The Lenity-Second Approach. Finally, a middle ground is the
lenity-second approach—a court applies lenity to a statute second only
to the text. Under the lenity-second approach, judges first identify the
text’s plain meaning and resolve as much ambiguity as possible with
textual canons.131 But if “reasonable doubt persists,” they apply lenity
before resorting to all other nontextual methods of interpretation.132
124. Price, supra note 23, at 894; see also Rabb, supra note 42, at 189 (noting that the lenityfirst approach is disfavored by modern courts).
125. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
126. Id. at 25–27.
127. Id. at 26.
128. Id. at 27.
129. See Price, supra note 23, at 893–94 (discussing a theory of lenity by which courts pick the
narrowest plausible interpretation of the statute).
130. Id. at 894–95.
131. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 107, at 299.
132. Price, supra note 23, at 891–92; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 107, at 299 (“The
criterion we favor is this: whether, after all the legitimate tools of interpretation have been
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Thus, under the lenity-second theory, lenity would be invoked only
after exhausting the textual canons but before considering other means
of interpretation, such as substantive canons, purpose, or legislative
history.133 The statute would not need to be “grievously ambiguous,”
but the ambiguity would still have to be within a reasonable doubt.134
A court would not use legislative history, purpose, or any other extratextual evidence to broaden the reading of the legislature’s text.135
Justice Scalia, one of lenity’s biggest proponents, thought that lenity
should operate this way.136
The lenity-second approach is exemplified in a dissent by Justice
Scalia. The case revolved around the interpretation of a statute
forbidding the “use” of a firearm in furtherance of narcotics
trafficking.137 The defendant had not used the firearm as a weapon—
the common contextual meaning of the term—but instead had used the
firearm to trade for drugs.138 The majority interpreted the text of the
statute broadly by harkening to Congress’s apparent purpose in
drafting the statute—guarding against the “dangerous combination” of
drugs and guns—thus encompassing a nonobvious meaning of the
“use” of a gun.139 In dissent, Justice Scalia insisted that the word “use”
should follow the ordinary textual meaning of the word in context—to
use as a weapon.140 At the very least, Justice Scalia urged, the debatable
nature of the term was “enough, under the rule of lenity, to require
finding for the [defendant].”141 So, first he turned to the text to

applied, ‘a reasonable doubt persists.’” (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990))).
133. See Price, supra note 23, at 891–92 (describing a theory of lenity by which lenity narrows
the use of nontextual interpretive methods).
134. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 107, at 299 (quoting Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108).
135. See Price, supra note 23, at 891–92 (“On this view, lenity operates to cut off broad
readings based on policy, legislative history, or other extratextual sources whenever the text
standing alone supports a narrower view.”).
136. For a brief examination of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence and legacy regarding lenity,
see Zachary S. Price, The Court After Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 2, 2016,
2:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-oflenity [https://perma.cc/2MK2-ARZM].
137. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242–43 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 225 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 239–40.
140. Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 246.
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determine the ordinary meaning of “use,” and, still finding ambiguity,
would have invoked lenity and held for the defendant.142
This lenity-second approach is the most desirable and workable
for Congress to codify. Although it still defers to Congress by first
following the text of a criminal statute, application of lenity before any
other methods of interpretation retains consistency, respects
constitutional notice requirements,143 and alerts Congress to be precise
in drafting statutes.
In United States v. Davis,144 a 2019 five–four decision, Justice Neil
Gorsuch appeared to endorse the lenity-second theory.145 Writing for
the majority in Davis, Justice Gorsuch first worked through several
textual canons of interpretation including the “consistent meaning”
canon, which presumes that the same language in related statutes has
a consistent meaning, and then conducted a broader contextual
analysis of the federal criminal code.146 Turning to the government’s
argument that the Court should use the constitutional avoidance
canon147 before resorting to lenity, he stated that “no one before us has
identified a case in which this Court has invoked the [constitutional
avoidance] canon to expand the reach of a criminal statute in order to
save it.”148 He explained further that expanding the statute under the
constitutional avoidance canon would “sit uneasily with the rule of
lenity’s teaching that ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal
statute should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”149 In essence,
142. See id. (“Even if the reader does not consider the issue to be as clear as I do, he must at
least acknowledge, I think, that it is eminently debatable—and that is enough, under the rule of
lenity, to require finding for the petitioner here.”). Elsewhere, Justice Scalia wrote:
If the rule of lenity means anything, it means that the Court ought not . . . use an illdefined general purpose to override an unquestionably clear term of art, and (to make
matters worse) give the words a meaning that even one unfamiliar with the term of art
would not imagine. The temptation to stretch the law to fit the evil is an ancient one,
and it must be resisted.
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 132 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (emphasizing clear statutory language
as being essential to fair warning).
144. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
145. See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
146. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2329.
147. Mentioned in supra Part I.B., the constitutional avoidance canon is a “substantive canon”
that directs “that statutory provisions should be construed to avoid giving rise to a serious
constitutional question.” HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 389.
148. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2332.
149. Id. at 2333. For a discussion of the interaction between legislative history and lenity, see
Newland, supra note 91, at 213–16.
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Justice Gorsuch elevated the rule of lenity above other possible
methods of statutory interpretation at his disposal, after textual canons.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh argued in dissent that under the
constitutional avoidance canon, it was the Court’s duty to first inquire
whether the statute could “reasonably, plausibly, or fairly possibly be
interpreted” as constitutional, before turning to any consideration of
lenity.150 Essentially, Justice Kavanaugh’s view was that the
constitutional avoidance canon would trump any further consideration
of the rule of lenity, at odds with Justice Gorsuch’s understanding of
the canons’ interaction. Justice Kavanaugh endorsed the lenity-last—
or at least, lenity-nearly-last—approach.151
Given the Court’s recent endorsement of the more robust lenitysecond approach, why would a codified rule of lenity be of any use?
The simple answer is that a different court composition could easily
undermine lenity’s slight victory in Davis. The Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that the use of any canon of statutory interpretation
does not have precedential weight and has, so far, declined to establish
any kind of canonical hierarchy to aid the lower courts.152 The federal
courts of appeals have been guilty of similar inconsistency regarding
lenity.153 Because canons are “usually deployed according to an
interpreter’s preferred methodology,”154 without some sort of
standardization, this discretionary usage will continue to be
inconsistent.
Though lenity ultimately triumphed in the Court’s latest
application, the five–four opinion leaves a strong application of lenity
in doubt. While the Davis Court may agree that lenity-second is the
correct approach, a slightly different Court composition could easily
undercut this small victory for lenity, continuing the inconsistent
application of lenity. Additionally, the lower federal courts need
guidance on lenity’s role in the interpretation of criminal statutes.

150. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336, 2349 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
151. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the lenity-last approach).
152. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“For one thing, canons
are not mandatory rules. They are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’ They are designed to help
judges determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular statutory language. And other
circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001))).
153. Price, supra note 23, at 927–28.
154. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341,
343 (2010).
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Congress should step in and codify the lenity-second approach to
protect this essential doctrine from obscurity. Though Davis
demonstrates the Court’s relatively recent support for the lenitysecond approach, a codified rule of lenity would solidify lenity’s role in
a way that would survive changes in the Court’s composition—and
address the critical issues in the criminal justice system.
B. The Validity of Congress’s Codification of Canons
Generally speaking, textual and substantive “canons are nothing
more than common law.”155 However, to address the problems with the
uncertainty of statutory interpretation, every state, the District of
Columbia, and, even to an extent, Congress have codified certain
canons of construction.156 These codified canons include a wide range
of textual and substantive rules.157
Congress has enacted only one general rule to aid federal courts
in statutory interpretation: the Dictionary Act, which provides
definitions of certain words applicable across the entire U.S. Code.158
Some statutes, however, have their own codified method of
interpretation. For example, a provision in the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970159 (“RICO”)
mandates that “[t]he provisions of this title . . . shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”160 The Supreme Court
has indeed consistently construed RICO liberally, as Congress
commanded.161 Notably, however, no federal statute gives federal

155. Id. at 344.
156. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, supra note 62, at 896 (citing Scott,
supra note 154, at 341, 350 & n.35 (listing all codified canons)); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
157. Scott, supra note 154, at 351.
158. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive
Canons, supra note 62, at 898 & n.307.
159. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(2018).
160. Id. § 1961; see also Julian R. Murphy, Lenity and the Constitution: Could Congress
Abrogate the Rule of Lenity?, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 444 (2019) (“In its RICO jurisprudence,
the Court has admittedly given words in criminal provisions broad meaning, but that is because
the provisions themselves are ‘drafted . . . broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal
activity.’” (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989))).
161. Murphy, supra note 160, at 444.
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courts any “interpretive methodology” or “hierarchy of tools to be
consulted in any particular order.”162
At the state level, legislatures have codified many varying
statutory interpretation rules and cross-cutting directives. Different
states have codified the plain meaning rule,163 the presumption of
consistent usage,164 the presumption of a “reasonable” intention of the
legislature,165 and the use of legislative history.166 For example, New
York uses “a set of . . . interpretation guidelines that specifically invite
its courts to be Intentionalist interpreters.”167 It mandates that “[t]he
primary consideration of the courts” is to “give effect to the intention
of the Legislature,” first from a literal reading, then, if the statute is still
ambiguous, “from such facts” that may “legitimately reveal it.”168 Thus,
legislatures have a history of giving interpretative guidance to courts,
and courts generally adhere to those precepts. Congress could add
lenity to this body of codified interpretive canons.169
Several legal scholars suggest that a comprehensive federal
framework of all canons of statutory interpretation should be
enacted.170 They offer ideas of a legislative “Federal Rules of Statutory

162. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, supra note 62, at 898 & n.307.
163. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 1-1-4-1(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Regular
Session of the 121st General Assembly) (“Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or
ordinary and usual, sense.”).
164. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-101 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Regular Session
and the Nov. 3, 2020 election) (“Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular
meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”).
165. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Regular Session and 1st
through 6th Special Sessions) (“In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may
[presume]: (1) the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable . . . .”).
166. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019
Regular Session of the 86th Legislature) (“In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is
considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: . . . (3)
legislative history . . . .”). See generally Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750
(2010) (describing state legislatures’ embrace of legislative history as a method of statutory
interpretation); Scott, supra note 154 (discussing state legislatures’ treatment of legislative
history).
167. HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 322.
168. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92 (McKinney 2016).
169. See infra Part III.A.
170. See, e.g., Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (proposing that the American Law Institute create a
“Restatement of Statutory Interpretation”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
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Interpretation,” similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,171 and
a nonlegislative “Restatement of Statutory Interpretation” modeled
after restatements such as the Restatement of Contracts.172 They argue
that because Congress has already recognized the value of these types
of “controlling interpretive frameworks to assist other areas” of law
such as civil procedure or contract interpretation, a specific framework
for statutory interpretation would be entirely valid.173 In statutory
interpretation, the “role of the judge is arguably more cabined” than
compared to “common law or constitutional interpretation.”174 This is
especially true because of the superior role of the legislature and “the
nature of legislation itself” when interpreting statutes.175
Alternatively, other scholars argue that the legislature veers into
unconstitutional territory under the separation of powers doctrine
when it attempts general “interpretive directives.”176 General
interpretive directives are statutes that apply generally to all or a large
part of the laws created by Congress.177 The Dictionary Act, referenced
above, is such a statute because it “provides definitions and
interpretive instructions for ‘any Act of Congress.’”178 General
directives can be further divided into retrospective and prospective
categories.179 The main objection to retrospective general directives is
that they could create “particularly reckless amendments” of statutes,
whereas the primary objection to prospective general directives is that
they could unduly “bind” future Congresses.180 These are valid
considerations—however, there are strong responses to them.

Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2089 (2002) (proposing that Congress
promulgate a “Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation”).
171. Rosenkranz, supra note 170, at 2089.
172. O’Connor, supra note 170, at 334.
173. Gluck, supra note 166, at 1849–50.
174. Id. at 1848–49.
175. Id. at 1849.
176. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 842 (2009)
(“[I]nterpretive directives are likely unconstitutional when enacted to apply generally to many
statutes . . . .”).
177. Rosenkranz, supra note 170, at 2110.
178. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); Rosenkranz, supra note 170, at 2110.
179. Rosenkranz, supra note 170, at 2110.
180. Id. at 2120; see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3, at 125–
26 n.1 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that it would “raise serious constitutional questions” to allow
provisions of a specific statute to “[a]utomatically . . . give determinative weight . . . to previously
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One response is found in Congress’s power “[t]o make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its
enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”181 “[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause permits
Congress to proscribe any procedure or practice of courts that impairs
the faithful exercise of ‘[t]he judicial Power’ and to prescribe rules and
procedures conducive to the faithful exercise of that power.”182
Codified rules of statutory interpretation, like the rule of lenity, are
“necessary and proper” to effectuate the will of the legislature and to
interpret statutes more accurately and justly. Creating law is inherently
in the power of the legislature, not the judiciary, and a legislature
clarifying its own laws is not violating the separation of powers
doctrine. A codified lenity rule would not improperly bind a future
Congress because a future legislature could always repeal the lenity
statute.183
The important point is that, because the legislature controls and
drafts statutes, codifying those statutes’ interpretation gives the
legislature a say in how they are understood without overstepping its
bounds. Scholars largely agree that codified canons are a valid use of
legislative power, not a usurpation from the courts nor a separation of
powers violation.184
enacted legislative ‘rules’ of construction” because it would permit earlier Congresses to require
action by a subsequent Congress).
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
182. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1590–91 (2000).
183. However, a powerful counterargument to this point is that it is very difficult to repeal a
law, possibly even more difficult than passing a law in the first place. Philip K. Howard, Obsolete
Law—The Solutions, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2012/03/obsolete-law-0151-the-solutions/255141 [https://perma.cc/ARV8-ZNJZ]. Though of
course, this counterargument applies to any new legislation.
184. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?,
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 819 (1998) (arguing that Congress enacting legislation to guide
statutory interpretation would not usurp the judicial function in any way); O’Connor, supra note
170, at 344 (stating that one way to deal with the common law “messiness” of the canons of
interpretation is to codify canons or create rules-enabling legislation); Rosenkranz, supra note
170, at 2091 (arguing that Congress has at least some constitutional power over interpretive
methodology); Ross, supra note 77, at 574–78 (arguing that Congress can take certain actions in
drafting legislation to guidepost their intent and thus “minimize situations where statutory
language invokes a descriptive canon contrary to the legislative intent”); Scott, supra note 154, at
344 (“Because the canons are nothing more than common law, legislative enactments that
repudiate or ratify canons should not only be included in any conversation about the canons, but
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An additional counterargument against codifying statutory
interpretation is that judges will simply continue to follow their own
policy preferences and discount direction from the legislature.
However, “[a]cknowledging that ideology plays a role in judicial
decisionmaking does not mean that the role of law should completely
be discounted.”185 Empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that judges
are constrained by legal doctrine such as codified canons in the states
“some of the time—and often, much of the time,” which would apply
equally to a federal scheme of codification.186 Were lenity codified,
some judges most likely would continue to follow their own methods
of interpreting criminal statutes, but absolute perfection is not the
expectation here. At the very least, codified lenity would “narrow the
range of permissible outcomes,” which would partially serve codified
lenity’s intended effect—to provide more uniformity across federal
criminal law and give added notice to criminal defendants and
congressional drafters.187
C. Why Codify the Rule of Lenity?
Codifying lenity would solidify its uniform role in the criminal
justice system and create a more powerful version of the doctrine. This
powerful version of lenity would promote the due process rights of
criminal defendants. It could “demand more specificity from Congress
and narrow substantive criminal laws and penalty provisions,
especially” where there is some doubt as to Congress’s original intent
and where the stakes are high, as they are in all criminal cases.188
Codification itself could help create this robust version of lenity by
broadcasting widely the seriousness and vigorous function of the new

should be considered important and controlling.”); Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions
in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 219 (1994) (proposing that “[l]egislatures could devise a
variety of novel interpretive directions that could have a significant impact on judicial statutory
interpretation”).
185. Gluck, supra note 166, at 1850.
186. Id.; see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1004
(2009) (“Unanimous opinions provide some evidence that justices of otherwise diverse
ideological outlooks acknowledge the existence of rules capable of dictating legally correct
outcomes—not chosen on the basis of ideological preferences—when those rules clearly apply.”).
187. See Gluck, supra note 166, at 1850 (stating that, although methodology does not dictate
outcomes, methodology can affect outcomes).
188. Hopwood, supra note 28, at 695.
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rule to both courts and Congress, which would help “maximiz[e] the
democratic accountability of our criminal justice system.”189
1. Uniformity in the Courts. Consistency is “central[] to the rule of
law in general,” but it also “has a special role to play in judge-made
law.”190 Given the importance of lenity and the constitutionally
mandated due process rights of criminal defendants, uniformity is
especially essential in this context. Currently, it is “impossible to
predict which canons a court may choose to employ when it endeavors
to resolve statutory doubt” and “how much weight a court will give any
particular canon of construction,” leaving the defendant at the mercy
of the judge’s ideology.191 In the criminal context, this lack of
uniformity could potentially make the defendant’s outcome dependent
on the judge’s interpretive preferences.192
In its statutory interpretation jurisprudence, the Court has
declined to give precedential weight to canons or to determine a
hierarchy of canons, further making it difficult to know how the courts
will interpret an admittedly ambiguous statute.193 Some scholars argue
that even if a court can eventually resolve statutory doubt by using “a
maze of canons and contradictory history,” by that point “it is too late
to allow the defendant meaningful notice of the crime or penalty.”194
With a federally mandated rule of lenity, law enforcement and
prosecutors will be on notice that textually ambiguous statutes will be
construed against the state, not the defendant, and they can modify
their enforcement of ambiguous statutes accordingly.195
The application of a codified clear statement rule of lenity under
the lenity-second approach would provide a consistent method of

189. Price, supra note 23, at 925.
190. Antonin Scalia, Essay, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 581, 588 (1989–90).
191. David S. Romantz, Reconstructing the Rule of Lenity, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 523, 573
(2018).
192. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 130 (2006)
(concluding that federal judges appointed by Republican and Democratic “presidents are
systematically different, in their voting behavior”).
193. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
194. Romantz, supra note 191, at 574.
195. See Price, supra note 23, at 919–20 (arguing that the rule of lenity is an important check
on prosecutors because it incentivizes them to charge “real” crimes and stops their pursuit of
“novel theories”).
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statutory interpretation in criminal law that would allow the legislature
to clarify the language of the underlying statute.196 It would still allow
for reasoned analysis when judges evaluated statutes for the initial
ambiguity question but would also standardize the court’s decision
regarding the next step.197 Especially given the ever-increasing number
of federal laws, codified lenity would ensure more reliable notice for
the defendant.198 It would also “provid[e] a consistent interpretive
framework that allows only gradual change or modification in areas
involving certain protected values,” such as constitutional rights.199
Codification of lenity would still not achieve absolute uniformity.
Judges could still pick which textual canons to incorporate before
lenity, meaning that this first step could determine whether lenity
might be reached at all. But a clear statement rule could still provide a
more uniform standardized system by showing judges the importance
of lenity in interpretating the legislature’s preferences. It could also
give defendants on appeal a stronger challenge to their conviction—
that judges did not properly apply the lenity statute—which could
further protect their due process rights.
2. Notice to Defendants—and Congress. Though lenity’s notice
rationale is somewhat a fiction, as potential defendants generally do
not read statutes, Justice Holmes explained the notice rationale as
follows:
196. In defense of lenity, Justice Scalia said: “Treating [lenity] as a clear-statement rule would
comport with the original basis for the canon and would provide considerable certainty.” SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 107, at 298.
197. Courts apply the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in a similar way—following the standard
Guidelines but making appropriate reasoned exceptions for unique cases. Pursuant to the
Guidelines, a sentencing court must first identify the precise sentencing range appropriate for the
convicted person’s conduct and offender characteristics. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1A1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UC9-LCPD]. The court usually must stay within
the standard sentencing range, but it can sentence outside of the Guidelines’ range in special
circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2018). Then, the appellate court can review the
“reasonableness” of the departure from the prescribed range. Id. § 3742(e)(3).
198. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 35 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We face a
Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in general, and of criminal laws in
particular.”); Hopwood, supra note 28, at 699 (“Given the breadth and seriousness of federal
criminal law, construing these statutes broadly creates a great risk that they will be applied
arbitrarily and will lead to excessive punishment. Broad or unclear laws also allow federal
prosecutors to stretch the law beyond what anyone had anticipated.”).
199. Newland, supra note 91, at 204–05 (citing Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 98, at 1008–
09).
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Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the
text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line
is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should
be clear.200

So, the issue is not just whether defendants have notice of what
the law says; the issue is whether those tasked with defining federal
criminal law—members of Congress—give notice that conduct is
prohibited so law enforcement can administer laws appropriately. The
rule of law must be based on law, and the principle that statutes should
be “comprehensible” to defendants “reaffirms the rule of law each
time punishment is meted out.”201 Congress has enacted many broad
criminal statutes with poor definitions and “enormous breadth and
depth” which has contributed to the outrageously high incarceration
rate in the United States.202 A clear statement law of lenity could have
a “cautionary effect” on Congress, “stimulating more thought and
deliberation as legislators set about building majorities for explicit
prohibitions.”203 Congress could “no longer obscure its political choices
behind vague or ambiguous provisions,” a result which would “better
express[]” society’s will.204 Instead, Congress would be accountable to
the people for the exact words that it wrote—and reap any
consequences for those policy choices.
A codified rule of lenity would give Congress notice that its
members must compose laws that unambiguously prescribe punishable
conduct. The Supreme Court said that the fundamental principle of
lenity—“that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a
statute whose commands are uncertain”—should “induce Congress to
speak more clearly.”205 Currently, empirical data suggests that
congressional staffers responsible for drafting legislation “try hard to
legislate within constitutional bounds” but “demonstrate[] little

200. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
201. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 135 (1998).
202. Smith, supra note 98, at 585; see Sykes, 564 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We face a
Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of . . . criminal laws in particular.”);
Hopwood, supra note 28, at 699 (describing the current era of overcriminalization and excessive
punishment and attributing it partially to the expanding federal criminal code).
203. Price, supra note 23, at 915.
204. Hopwood, supra note 28, at 732.
205. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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knowledge of . . . the rule of lenity.”206 But, with a federal codified rule
of lenity, members of Congress and staffers might have a greater
understanding of the constitutional directive and keep it in mind when
drafting criminal statutes.207 As Justice Scalia argued, “[R]ules like
[lenity], so deeply ingrained, must be known to both drafter and reader
alike so that they can be considered inseparable from the meaning of
the text.”208
In drafting generally applicable criminal statutes, Congress may
not be entirely accurate, and the proscribed conduct will almost always
be underinclusive or overinclusive. Codified lenity, however, could
give Congress more guidance in drafting statutes to avoid
overinclusion. It could aid Congress in “recogniz[ing] the full extent of
the consequences it is imposing on individuals,” because it would alert
Congress that without a clear description of the prohibited conduct, the
courts would apply lenity.209
Should Congress desire to draft a broad statute where lenity does
not apply, they would still be able to do so. Certain federal statutes that
were deliberately drafted vaguely, such as RICO or other white-collar
criminal statutes, could easily include a “built-in directive that [the
statute] should be interpreted liberally.”210 This built-in directive would
not undermine lenity’s notice justification because defendants would
have notice that this specific statute provides for wide application.211
Thus, codified lenity could be a powerful tool in defense of the two
main constitutional protections that lenity provides: uniformity and

206. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, supra note 62, at 898–99. Researchers
found that only 35 percent of surveyed drafters of federal criminal legislation knew “lenity” by
name. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 946 (2013).
207. See Scalia, supra note 190, at 583 (“[T]he legislature presumably has [rules of strict
construction] in mind when it chooses its language—as would be the case, for example, if the
Supreme Court were to announce and regularly act upon the proposition that ‘is’ shall be
interpreted to mean ‘is not.’”).
208. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 107, at 31. However, commentators have also argued that
“[l]enity has rarely, if ever, been said to be about making Congress draft better or approximating
how Congress drafts” but instead is simply a “constitutional backstop” for the courts. Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 206, at 957.
209. Newland, supra note 91, at 206.
210. Solan, supra note 201, at 140.
211. See id. at 140–41 (noting that RICO has its own built-in directive to be interpreted
liberally, and that “[h]owever badly RICO was drafted, it provides adequate notice to anyone
engaged in its predicate acts of fraud and violence that there is potential criminal liability”).
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notice. It is especially imperative that Congress safeguard criminal
defendants from infringements on their constitutional rights.
III. A SOLUTION TO THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LENITY IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CODIFICATION OF THE LENITY-SECOND
APPROACH
A partial solution to lenity’s uncertain role is to codify it in the
U.S. Code. First, this Part looks at comparable statutes from state
legislatures that codified lenity or, conversely, prohibited the use of the
doctrine. Next, it discusses the specific formulation of codified lenity
that this Note suggests.
A. State Approaches to Lenity
Though Congress has codified only one true type of canon of
statutory interpretation,212 the states have been much more active. This
Section explores explicit anti-lenity state statutes, then discusses state
statutes codifying lenity.
1. Elimination of Lenity by State Statute. “[M]ore than two-thirds
of” states once codified their own version of the rule of lenity,213 but
most have since repealed this explicit directive, instead implicitly
eliminating lenity through a general “liberal construction” statute.214
For example, the Arkansas Code directs that “[a]ll general provisions,
terms, phrases, and expressions used in any statute shall be liberally
construed in order that the true intent and meaning of the General
Assembly may be fully carried out.”215 Effectively, these state
legislatures have instructed courts to unilaterally decide whether or not
212. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
213. HUEFNER, supra note 68, at 389.
214. Scott, supra note 154, at 399. At least a few scholars in the early twentieth century
believed the trend toward liberal construction grew from the public’s and the legislatures’
frustration with “judicial obstruction or nullification of the social policies to which more and more
it is compelled to be committed.” Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 383, 407 (1908); see Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48
HARV. L. REV. 748, 760 (1930) (“The public is already impatient with the refined, and for practical
purposes unnecessary, distinctions embodied in the penal codes.”).
215. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-202 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 First Extraordinary
Session and the 2020 Fiscal Session of the 92nd Arkansas General Assembly); see HUEFNER,
supra note 68, at 389 (noting that some states repealed their explicit directives “in favor of a nonsubstantive canon . . . ‘to promote justice’”); Price, supra note 23, at 902–03 (noting that statutes,
in addition to “common law principles,” regulate statutory construction in many states).
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to construe a statute against a defendant, depending upon their
interpretation of the “intent” of the legislature. Some states go a step
further, and explicitly codify a ban on the use of strict construction.216
For example, the California Civil Code states, “The rule of the
common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed, has no application to this Code.”217 Essentially, these state
legislatures have directed courts not to apply lenity regularly. And a
few states have gone even further, codifying liberal construction and
banning strict construction.218
In spite of these statutes, according to scholars, state courts often
use the common law version of lenity to operate as a tiebreaker when
all other interpretive tools have been spent, even in states that codified
a prohibition on the consistent application of lenity.219 Due to lenity’s
constitutional importance, most state courts of last resort have either
completely ignored their state’s abrogation of lenity or have somewhat
limited its application.220 For instance, courts in Arizona, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Dakota “continue to employ the
rule of lenity despite statutes directing them not to.”221 Cases in these
states do not mention the state statute and just use the doctrine of
lenity without comment on its interaction with the legislature’s

216. Scott, supra note 154, at 399, 424 (listing the following state statutes as expressly rejecting
the rule of lenity (i.e., strict construction): ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-211(B) (2019); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-212 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-102 (2019); 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.01 (2019); IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (2019); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 446.015, .080 (West 2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2019); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-2-103 (2019); N.M. STAT. § 12-2A-18 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (2008); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 25, § 29 (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-12 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 68-3-2 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.010 (2019)).
217. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 372 of 2020 Regular Session); see
also IDAHO CODE § 73-102 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Regular and First
Extraordinary Session of the 65th Idaho Legislature) (“The rule of the common law that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to these compiled laws.”).
218. Scott, supra note 154, at 399.
219. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 379 (“In the state courts, our perception is that
the rule [of lenity] is alive and well, usually operating as a tiebreaker . . . .”); Solan, supra note
201, at 128 (“The [California and New York] courts continue to feel that a tie-breaker is needed
despite legislative action seemingly to the contrary.”).
220. Price, supra note 23, at 903–04 (citing Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1225 (Del. 1996);
Commonwealth v. White, 3 S.W.3d 353, 354–55 (Ky. 1999); People v. Denio, 564 N.W.2d 13, 17
(Mich. 1997); State v. Isom, 837 P.2d 491, 495 n.6 (Or. 1992); State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911,
912 (Utah 1974)).
221. Id. (citing Reinesto v. Superior Ct., 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Richard, 786 A.2d 876, 879 (N.H. 2001); State v. Laib, 644 N.W.2d 878, 883 (N.D. 2002)).
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directive.222 The California Supreme Court, however, has expressly
declined to follow that state’s statute abrogating lenity, due to lenity’s
“constitutional underpinnings.”223 Overall, most states remain flexible
in their approach to lenity, and the application of the rule varies
haphazardly across the states.224
2. State Codification of Lenity. So far, three states have codified
the rule of lenity.225 Florida’s rule is as follows: “The provisions of this
code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed;
when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be
construed most favorably to the accused.”226 Many court opinions in
the state cite to this statute,227 and the Florida Senate’s Committee on
Criminal Justice has praised the doctrine for ensuring that “people who
rely upon a reasonable interpretation of statutory language are not
punished as criminals.”228 The Florida Supreme Court called the rule

222. See e.g., Reinesto, 894 P.2d at 735 (“When the meaning of a statute is unclear or subject
to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity requires us to resolve any ambiguity in favor of
the defendant.”); Richard, 786 A.2d at 879 (“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, the rule
of lenity demands that all doubt be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple
offenses and thereby expanding the statutory penalty.”); Laib, 644 N.W.2d at 883 (“[T]he rule of
lenity ‘serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity . . . .’” (quoting United States v. ValenciaAndrade, 72 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1995))).
223. People v. Avery, 38 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2002).
224. For an overview of states’ application of lenity, see Price, supra note 23, at 904–06.
225. These states are Florida, Ohio, and Texas. See infra notes 226, 242, and 256. Though not
explicitly codifying lenity, some state codes direct judges to consider equity and “natural rights”
in criminal statutory interpretation. Scott, supra note 154, at 401. Utah’s state code elevates
“equity” (and its “dictates of fairness and conscience”) over the common law. Id.; see UTAH CODE
ANN. § 68-3-2(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Sixth Special Session) (“When there is a
conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter,
the rules of equity prevail.”). Both Montana and Oregon assert that when faced with an
ambiguous statute, a judge must adopt the “one in favor of natural right.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 12-104 (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Session); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.030 (West,
Westlaw through the 2020 Regular Session of the 80th Legislative Assembly) (“Where a statute
is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it,
the former is to prevail.”). These types of statutes have been criticized for their lack of clarity and
allowing for too much judicial discretion. Scott, supra note 154, at 401.
226. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Regular Session of the
Twenty-Sixth Legislature).
227. For a few examples, see the following cases: State v. Weeks, 202 So. 3d 1, 8–9 (Fla. 2016);
Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008); Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111–12 (Fla.
2007); State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 294 (Fla. 2001).
228. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., FLA. SENATE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LAWS 8 n.59 (2010), https://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/2011/Publications/
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of lenity a “fundamental tenet of Florida law regarding the
construction of criminal statutes, which weighs in favor of the
defendant,”229 though it has also called legislative intent ‘“the polestar
that guides’ the Court’s inquiry.”230 In spite of its praise of lenity,
Florida’s overall application of the law appears to fall into the lenitylast category because it has also called lenity a “canon of last resort.”231
Despite using it as a canon of last resort, the Florida Supreme
Court has used the lenity statute to overturn criminal convictions. In
State v. Weeks,232 defendant Christopher Weeks pled no contest to
being a felon in possession of a firearm when he was caught using a
firearm for hunting.233 However, prior to possessing the gun, Weeks
had researched Florida law and believed that his firearm fell under
Florida’s exception for felons’ possession of a “replica” of an “antique
firearm.”234 The trial court found Weeks guilty.235 The appellate court
concluded that Weeks’s firearm fell under the “replica of an antique”
exemption in the statute because the firing mechanism itself was the
defining feature of the antique, and Weeks’s replica used an antique
firing mechanism.236 The Florida Supreme Court examined the
statute’s text, applied textual canons, and looked to the legislative
history and intent.237 It held that the statute was ambiguous and that
Florida’s codified rule of lenity supported a construction of the statute
that favored the defendant.238
But the Florida statute does not go far enough. Weeks was unique
in that he took affirmative steps to ensure that he was within the

InterimReports/pdf/2011-212cj.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EJ2-YZTS] (quoting Cuellar v. State, 70
S.W.3d 815, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
229. Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 8 (quoting Polite, 973 So. 2d at 1112).
230. Rife, 789 So. 2d at 292 (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998)).
231. Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 8 (quoting Kasischke, 991 So. 2d at 814); see also Rife, 789 So. 2d at
294 (identifying lenity as “the default principle in construing criminal statutes”).
232. State v. Weeks, 202 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016).
233. Id. at 3–4.
234. Id. at 3; see FLA. STAT. § 790.23 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Regular
Session of the Twenty-Sixth Legislature) (banning convicted felons from possessing firearms);
FLA. STAT. § 790.001(6) (exempting antique firearms); FLA. STAT. § 790.001(1) (defining antique
firearms).
235. Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 4.
236. Weeks v. State, 146 So. 3d 81, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
237. Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 7–8, 9.
238. Id. at 8–9.
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confines of the law by researching the felon-in-possession statute.239 He
sought out information to be on notice of the law. But, because lenity
is a “canon of last resort,”240 if the Florida court had found evidence in
the legislative history to imply that the legislature meant for the felonin-possession statute to apply to his replica antique firearm, his
affirmative steps to conform with the law would have been
meaningless. The unique facts of Weeks’s case, and the precise details
of his firearm’s firing mechanism, ultimately allowed the Florida court
to approve the reversal of his conviction.241 But had there been more
dispute over the exact specifications of the gun, the court might easily
have upheld the conviction based on its own interpretation of
legislative history or intent. Alternatively, the lenity-second approach
would provide more protection for individuals like Weeks. In a case
with more controversy over whether the exact elements of a firearm
fell into the exception, lenity-second would give the benefit of the
doubt to the defendant based on the plain meaning of the text before
turning to more unpredictable methods.
Ohio has also codified lenity. When faced with an ambiguous
statute, “sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties
shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in
favor of the accused.”242 Consistent with its statute, Ohio has also
interpreted U.S. Supreme Court decisions to hold that “an ambiguous
criminal statute must be construed in favor of the defendant.”243 The
Ohio Supreme Court has held that lenity should be used in an
ambiguous statute before turning to legislative intent, which implies
that it employs the lenity-second approach.244

239. See id. at 9 (describing Weeks’s efforts in researching and applying the relevant statutes
to his conduct).
240. Id. at 8 (quoting Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008)).
241. Id. at 9–10.
242. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (West, Westlaw through 2019–2020 General
Assembly); see also State v. Polus, 48 N.E.3d 553, 555 (Ohio 2016) (approving the application of
§ 2901.04(A) in criminal cases).
243. State v. Stevens, 11 N.E.3d 252, 255 (Ohio 2014) (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971)); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2007) (plurality opinion)
(“Under a long line of our decisions . . . [t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to
be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”).
244. See Polus, 48 N.E.3d at 555 (noting that generally, courts “consider several factors to
determine legislative intent,” but “[i]n criminal cases,” courts apply the rule of lenity); Stevens, 11
N.E.3d at 255 (additionally criticizing the lower court’s considering the legislative history and
intent to resolve the textual ambiguity).
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In State v. Stevens,245 the Ohio Supreme Court—without first
turning to other methods of interpretation—resolved in favor of
defendants charged under a textually ambiguous statute.246 The two
defendants, Zachary Bondurant and Jeffrey Stevens, were involved in
low-level drug sales that amounted to just $460 and $250 respectively.247
The state charged them with “engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity”
in violation of Ohio’s version of RICO that only kicked in if the
threshold amount involved exceeded $500.248 The statutory ambiguity
was whether the $500 threshold applied to the criminal enterprise as a
whole or to each individual involved in the enterprise.249 The Ohio
Supreme Court stated that the lower court’s decision—that the statute
meant $500 for the enterprise as a whole—was incorrectly based on
what it thought “the legislature likely intended.”250 Instead, because the
statute was textually ambiguous, it was a “longstanding principle of
Ohio law” that ambiguous criminal statutes were to be construed in the
defendants’ favor.251 This principle protected the two alleged “smalltime drug dealers” from serving seven and nine years in prison
respectively,252 demonstrating the power of the lenity-second
application.
Texas’s codified rule of strict construction, which applies only to
certain offenses, at first seems more aggressive than the general lenity
statutes from Florida and Ohio,253 and commentators have called the
statute “far more explicit and demanding than its counterparts in
Florida and Ohio.”254 To prevent “the erosion of [the rule of lenity]”
and “to ensure uniform, consistent application throughout the state,”255

245. State v. Stevens, 11 N.E.3d 252 (Ohio 2014).
246. Id. at 255–56.
247. Id. at 252.
248. Id. at 252–53.
249. Id. at 253.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 252–53, 255.
253. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, Turning the Rule of Lenity into a Rule of
Lenity, 163 HERITAGE FOUND. 5 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/
report/turning-the-rule-lenity-rule-lenity [https://perma.cc/36KX-55U5] (“While some Texas
courts have vigorously applied the Rule of Lenity in the past . . . [the Texas lenity statute] has the
potential for more uniform application and robust accountability.”).
254. Id. at 4.
255. TEX. HOUSE RSCH. ORG., BILL ANALYSIS: H.B. 1396 1–2 (2015), https://
hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ba84r/hb1396.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9P8-YW66].

WILSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

THE LAW OF LENITY

3/25/2021 8:04 PM

1699

in 2015, the Texas legislature codified the rule of lenity as applied to a
very limited number of criminal offenses outside of its Penal Code:
[A] statute or rule that creates or defines a criminal offense or penalty
shall be construed in favor of the actor if any part of the statute or
rule is ambiguous on its face or as applied to the case, including:
(1) an element of offense; or
(2) the penalty to be imposed.256

The Texas House stated this statute would “act as a reminder to
courts and prosecutors working outside of the Penal Code that the rule
[of lenity] should be applied” and that it would give notice to the Texas
legislature to clarify any ambiguous statutes.257 The statute also “gives
the courts less opportunity to evade its demands through creative
interpretation” and has instilled hope in commentators that it will have
“its intended effect” of guarding the rule of lenity.258
However, given the statute’s limited reach to only criminal
statutes outside of Texas’s Penal Code and the Texas Controlled
Substances Act,259 its impact has thus far not been large. One published
case, State v. Cortez,260 involved a defendant, Jose Luis Cortez, whose
car tires allegedly touched the white painted line on the road separating
it from the shoulder.261 A state trooper pulled him over for the traffic
infraction and found drugs in Cortez’s vehicle.262 In affirming the trial
court’s suppression hearing ruling in favor of Cortez, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals agreed that a tire touching the white painted line
on the road did not violate the traffic law forbidding driving on the
shoulder of the road.263 It refused to broadly interpret the traffic law
because “[c]riminal statutes outside the penal code must be construed
strictly, with any doubt resolved in favor of the accused.”264 The
concurrence agreed, citing Texas’s lenity statute, but noted that since
256. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.035(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Regular Session
of the 86th Legislature).
257. TEX. HOUSE RSCH. ORG., supra note 255, at 2.
258. Larkin & Seibler, supra note 253, at 4.
259. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.035(c) (“Subsection (b) [the lenity rule] does not apply to
a criminal offense or penalty under the Penal Code or under the Texas Controlled Substances
Act.”).
260. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
261. Id. at 200.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 206.
264. Id. (quoting Stevenson v. State, 499 S.W.3d 842, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).
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“the text, structure, and history” did not cure the ambiguity of the
traffic law, the court was compelled “to draw the line in favor of”
Cortez.265
Besides Cortez, few published cases have yet applied the 2015
Texas statute. And as of yet, we do not know where the Texas state
courts will apply this limited application of lenity within their statutory
interpretation, though the Cortez concurrence implies that the statute’s
history should aid in the initial ambiguity determination.266 This may
mean that Texas will use lenity-last, in spite of commentators’ hope for
a more aggressive Texas rule.267
The states that have codified lenity are moving toward a more
uniform system of statutory interpretation as it relates to criminal
defendants, which provides notice to defendants of how their conduct
will be judged and how they will be sentenced. It also notifies
legislatures that courts will interpret their statutes with lenity in mind.
This, in turn, may lead to legislatures drafting less ambiguous state
criminal statutes. The states that have codified lenity can be a source
of inspiration for Congress were it to enact its own codified lenity.
B. Codification of the Lenity-Second Approach
The lenity-second approach, where lenity would be applied
immediately after gleaning all possible meaning from the text, is the
best formulation of lenity for codification.268 Although no version of

265. Id. at 210–11.
266. See id. at 210 (“This text tells us nothing about how a shoulder may be distinguished from
the roadway by markings. Neither is there any legislative history regarding this portion of the
statute.”).
267. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.023 (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Regular Session of
the 86th Legislature) (“In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous
on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: . . . (3) legislative history . . . .”); Larkin
& Seibler, supra note 253, at 5 (calling § 311.035 “[a]n aggressive lenity statute”).
268. Take for example, the difference the lenity-second approach would make in Muscarello
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), discussed in supra Part II.A.1. The Supreme Court found
that the defendant was guilty of “us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm” in drug trafficking when the gun
was locked away in his glove compartment. Id. at 126–27. Lenity-second would mandate that the
ordinary meaning of the terms “using” and “carrying” would prevail, sufficiently notifying the
defendant of forbidden conduct. Muscarello, a convicted drug trafficker, admittedly is not the
most sympathetic example, and implementing lenity-second might allow individual defendants
like Muscarello to walk free. But even if a few unsympathetic defendants receive favorable
treatment, lenity’s purposes of giving notice to individuals of prohibited conduct, mandating more
precise language from Congress, and punishing only specific proscribed conduct would overall
benefit society and the criminal justice system at large.
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lenity will cure all the “ills of the criminal justice system,” lenity-second
codification could be a powerful tool to combat overcriminalization.269
To effectuate the lenity-second approach, Congress could draft a
statute similar to the codified rules of lenity in Florida and Texas270
though making clear that the initial ambiguity question should be
resolved by a textual analysis. For example:
An ambiguous statute or rule that creates or defines a criminal
offense or penalty shall be construed against the government and
construed in favor of the accused. When the language is susceptible
to differing constructions based on textual analysis, it shall be
construed most favorably to the accused if any part of the statute or
rule is susceptible to more than one objectively reasonable
interpretation of the text, including: (1) an element of offense; or (2)
the penalty to be imposed.

First, Congress’s intent, as expressed through written text, would
be followed using textual methods of statutory interpretation, an
approach which would respect legislative supremacy. The textual
canons themselves have widely accepted meanings and long-standing
usage.271 They allow for less judicial discretion based on value
judgments and create more uniformity across interpretation by
different judges.272 Next, after exhausting textual canons and still
finding ambiguity in the text, judges would immediately turn to lenity.
This lenity-second formulation respects both the direction of the
legislature through the text and the constitutional rights of the
defendant through lenity.
Lenity-second is superior to either the lenity-last or lenity-first
formulations. The lenity-last formulation would make the rule of lenity
all but worthless because Congress could always find some way to first
limit the statute’s ambiguity through one of its methods of
interpretation.273 It would leave no role for lenity as a tiebreaker. The
lenity-first formulation is too deferential to defendants, could be seen
269. Price, supra note 23, at 925.
270. See supra Part III.A.2.
271. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 341.
272. See id. at 356 (calling textual canons “probably relatively neutral in their allocational
effects”).
273. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 107, at 298 (arguing that invoking lenity “only when
the equipoise of competing reasons cannot otherwise be resolved” would mean either that the
rule would never apply or that it would be superfluous (quoting Johnson v. United States, 529
U.S. 694, 613 n.13 (2000))).

WILSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1702

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/25/2021 8:04 PM

[Vol. 70:1663

as judicial lawmaking, and could create separation of powers problems,
making it “probably not a realistic possibility, given the disregard of
legislative preferences that it would entail.”274 The lenity-second
approach instead strikes the best balance between the two interests at
stake—respecting legislative supremacy and providing due process
notice to criminal defendants.
CONCLUSION
Lenity is a powerful tool for courts that “vindicates the
fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to
punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”275 However, lenity’s power
has been weakened by its inconsistent application and discretionary
use by courts. With a rule of lenity enacted into federal law, this ancient
doctrine could be applied more consistently. The result would be
clearer statements from Congress, a greater understanding of
proscribed conduct, and fairer notice to individuals. Ultimately,
codified lenity would be a forceful mechanism to use in the quest for a
more just system of law.

274. Price, supra note 23, at 923–24.
275. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2007).

